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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
RECENT ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS AND
A SELECTIVE ANTITRUST PERSPECTIVE
OF THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
Stewart A. Pomerantz*
INTRODUCTION
Scarcely a day passes that we do not read about some new product
developed for travelers on the "information superhighway," some new
method of delivering the product, or some combination of entities be-
ing formed to manage the business opportunities associated with that
product. The information superhighway, as popularly conceived, will
produce more accessible means of conveying consumable product.
The increased access will create opportunities for the development of
new varieties of product itself, which in turn may prompt the develop-
ment of greater access. The resulting business environment allowing
new markets and profits will not fundamentally create novel antitrust
issues, but the boundaries of antitrust law will inform lawyers on man-
aging and establishing the opportunities that accompany the informa-
tion superhighway's development. While a complete exposition of the
relevant issues, the antitrust laws, and the interpretive case law would
fill volumes and cannot be fully discussed here, this section of the Re-
port will discuss selected major antitrust issues of recent interest as a
starting point for the practitioner unfamiliar with antitrust law. Part I
summarizes the Clinton Administration's continued attention to anti-
trust enforcement, including the issuance of new enforcement guide-
lines and the general concerns that Administration officials bring to
their review of market development and transactions related to the
information superhighway. Part I also reviews recent legislative
changes proposed for the telecommunications industry. Part II briefly
sets forth the framework of the principal antitrust statutes, the analyti-
cal approaches that have been developed by the courts in interpreting
these statutes, and the practical implications of the approaches for
practitioners. The final sections discuss some major issues raised by
recent transactions and other developments: essential facilities (part
III), horizontal and vertical mergers and innovation markets (part
IV), and intellectual property and technology licensing (part V). 638
* J.D., University of Chicago; B.A., Yale University; member of the New York,
District of Columbia, and Colorado bars.
638. This section of the Report necessarily oversimplifies antitrust law and the com-
plexity of the transactions and other commercial contexts in which antitrust issues
arise. There is a wealth of general and specialized treatises, law review articles, and
continuing legal education material available to the nonspecialized practitioner. For a
general overview of antitrust law, see ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Devel-
opments (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Antitrust Law Developments]; Phillip E. Areeda
et al., Antitrust Law (1978 & Supp. 1995 and rev. ed. 1995); Earl W. Kintner et al.,
Federal Antitrust Law (1980); William L. Liland, State Antitrust Law (1994); Thomas
V. Vakerics, Antitrust Basics (1995); Julian 0. von Kalinowski, Antitrust and Trade
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I. TH- CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND RECENT
LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
The Clinton Administration continues to state publicly that anti-
trust enforcement will remain a priority. At the Spring 1994 Meeting
of the American Bar Association, Assistant Attorney General Anne
K. Bingaman noted that in the prior six months the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice had commenced over fifty new civil con-
duct preliminary investigations.639 In over half these investigations,
compulsory process was issued, compared to the annual average in
prior years of four to eight investigations with compulsory process.6 0
On the merger front, in the prior six months the Division had inter-
vened in fourteen merger transactions, and in thirteen of those in-
stances the parties either abandoned the transaction or restructured it
to address competition concerns.641 In prior years, there had been ten
to twelve annual challenges. In 1993 the Division filed eighty-four
criminal cases against seventy-one corporations and fifty-one individu-
als, with convictions resulting in over $41 million in fines, 3673 days of
jail time, and 2704 days of non-jail confinement.612
The Administration has not hesitated to underscore the importance
of antitrust-related issues arising from the continual national debate
on the information superhighway. New antitrust enforcement guide-
lines have recently been issued regarding the acquisition and licensing
of intellectual property,613 indicating the Administration's attention to
an area firmly intertwined in the ongoing technological advances in
telecommunications and other industries. Enforcement attitudes,
moreover, implicitly recognize that the information superhighway and
other advanced technology industries develop in the context of a
global market. New guidelines also were proposed to address interna-
tional issues in the antitrust area, confirming a policy shift toward en-
forcing domestic antitrust laws against conduct abroad that thwarts
Regulation (1995). The practitioner must also be familiar with basic antitrust eco-
nomics, which has played an increasingly significant role in government and private
enforcement over the years. An extensive body of literature on economic analysis in
the antitrust context has arisen to supplement the law. For a basic introduction, see
the papers presented at the National Institute on Antitrust and Economics, collected
at 52 Antitrust L., 515 (1983). For some recent thinking on economic theory and
antitrust, see the papers presented at Symposium, Post-Chicago Economics, 63 Anti-
trust L.J 445 (1995). Antitrust counsel now commonly retain expert economists when
any significant transaction or adjudication is at issue.
639. 60 Minutes with Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice, 63 Antitrust i.. 323, 326 (1994) [hereinafter
Bingaman].
640. 1&
641. Id at 327-28.
642. Id. at 329.
643. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.




U.S. exports, and reiterating traditional antitrust jurisdiction over for-
eign conduct that affects domestic interstate or import commerce.
The Administration recognizes, for example, that horizontal and
vertical mergers in the telecommunications industry-fact-intensive
transactions of great scope and far-reaching effect-involve basic is-
sues that affect every consumer and therefore deserve close scru-
tiny.645 While horizontal mergers have been the traditional focus of
enforcement concern, vertical mergers raise issues of market foreclo-
sure, the raising of rivals' costs, the ease of coordination by horizontal
competitors, and the chilling effect on innovation; thus, vertical merg-
ers are also scrutinized.646 Although the Administration recognizes
that telephony, cable, and wireless technologies are converging, it cau-
tions that the alternatives arising from this convergence "are largely
prospective, they are not yet widely available and affordable, and it is
not yet clear when they will be," and that monopolies in these various
industries will not necessarily erode quickly enough in the face of ad-
vancing technological change.6 7
Underlying the scrutiny of mergers in the telecommunications and
computer industries is the recognition that many of the firms in these
industries, such as the regional Bell Companies and cable television
firms, have a dominant or monopoly position. The concern in these
cases is that the mergers may allow the extension of dominance in one
market into a second market, particularly where a regulated monop-
oly is involved.648 The enforcement agencies will attempt to obtain
agreement from merging firms to accept appropriate conditions that
will remove the anticompetitive effects of the transaction. 64 9
The Administration recognizes that the "information superhigh-
way" is a misnomer: the popular phrase masks the development of
multiple technological highways which will be acted on individually by
market forces to emerge as individual winners or losers.650 The Ad-
ministration has stated its explicit preferences as to the development
644. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,107, at 20,589 (Apr. 5, 1995). In 1994 the Administration obtained a consent
decree in an action against a British firm for using territorial and other restrictions in
licensing agreements that allegedly restrained competition in the world market for
float glass plants. United States v. Pilkington PLC, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 91 70,842
(D. Ariz. 1994).
645. Bingaman, supra note 639, at 342.
646. Id.
647. Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman, Competition Policy and the
Telecommunications Revolution, Address Before the Networked Economy Confer-
ence USA 9 (Sept. 26, 1994) [hereinafter Competition Policy] (on fie with the Ford-
ham Law Review).
648. Id. at 15-16.
649. This occurred, for example, in the recent AT&T-McCaw Cellular and the Brit-
ish Telecommunications-MCI acquisitions. See infra part IV.B.
650. Competition Policy, supra note 647, at 18-19.
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of these multiple highways. First, the highway developer that cur-
rently has a regulated monopoly should not finance other highways at
the expense of captive customers."' Second, at least during the next
several years, the Administration does not want the developer of a
highway in any geographic area to acquire a competing highway in the
same area.65 Third, where there are mergers or joint ventures be-
tween highway developers and content owners (producers of what
gets transported on the highway), the Administration will look at any
transaction to see if there is a risk that the integrated entity could
unreasonably foreclose highway access to competing content owners,
or content access to competing highways.653
The Administration generally supported legislation introduced in
the House and the Senate to change the competitive landscape of the
telecommunications industry. The proposed legislation took several
forms. For example, the Markey-Fields bill6- would have allowed tel-
ephone companies to provide cable programming in their service ar-
eas and sought to promote competition by current communications
providers and new entrants by requiring them to provide open net-
works to competitors. The Brooks-Dingell bill 65 5 would have modi-
fied the consent decree restrictions (known as the "Modified Final
Judgment" or "MFJ") resulting from the divestiture of AT&T5s6 by
allowing telephone companies to offer long distance service after
demonstrating to the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the FCC
that their monopoly power could not be used to impede competition.
It also allowed them to manufacture telecommunications equipment
subject to certain safeguards. The Breaux-Packwood bill65 would
have mandated the removal of entry barriers to the intrastate or inter-
state telecommunications markets and the provision by telephone
companies of long distance services after such barriers were removed.
Senator Robert Dole's initiative sought to go further toward complete
deregulation by providing a faster transition that allowed immediate
entry by telephone companies into all new markets without burden-
some entry tests.
For political and other reasons, by the fall of 1994 these bills were
not passed. Change at the legislative level, however, appears inevita-
ble. In 1995, Senator Larry Pressler, Chairman of the Senate Com-
merce, Science and Transportation Committee, is expected to
introduce the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act
651. Id. at 19.
652. Id.
653. Id. at 20.
654. H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
655. FLR. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
656. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). For a discussion of the restrictions
of the MFJ, see supra text accompanying notes 519-23.
657. S. 2111, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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of 1995, which will build on the failed legislative efforts and industry
lobbying of 1994. Republican members of the Committee issued a
broad policy statement outlining the legislation (the "Republican Pro-
posal"). 65 8 The Republican Proposal generally seeks to meet the
needs of the "new global information economy" by allowing technol-
ogy to follow or create new markets rather than allowing governmen-
tal micromanagement to limit telecommunications and information
technology development.659
Designed to foster competition in all telecommunications markets,
the Republican Proposal recognizes the need to lift the restrictions
imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the MFJ.6 60 The Re-
publican Proposal envisions a three-year transition period during
which new rules would open up local telephone monopoly markets to
competition.66' In the first year, the FCC and the states would adopt
rules to remove barriers to entry, establish interconnection and open-
ing requirements (i.e., opening networks to competitors), establish
separate subsidiary safeguards (i.e., for all competitive activities of
telecommunications providers), and establish a joint federal-state
board to support universal service. Foreign ownership restrictions im-
posed by the Communications Act of 1934 would be reformed on a
reciprocal basis. State and local barriers to entry then would be pre-
empted, the MFJ restrictions on out-of-region long distance, manufac-
turing and incidental services would be lifted, the cable-telephone
company cross ownership ban would be eliminated and cable rate reg-
ulation modified, and utilities would be allowed to enter telecommu-
nications markets.662
In the final phase, the FCC would be directed to change regulatory
treatment of all telecommunications providers so as to treat providers
of similar services in the same way.6 63 After interconnection and
opening requirements are satisfied, federal and state regulators would
establish price cap regulation. Biannual regulatory review would as-
sess the need for all remaining regulations. In areas where competi-
tion does not occur, incentives for deployment of advanced
telecommunications would be used.6 4 Changes to the shape of this
legislation are being negotiated on a daily basis, but it will certainly
658. Republicans Outline Proposal for New Telecommunications Bill, [Jan.-June]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1696, at 51-52 (Jan. 19, 1995) [hereinafter
Republican ProposalJ; Executive Summary of Senate Republicans' Proposal on Tele-
communications Reform Legislation, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1696, at 68 (Jan. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Policy Summary].
659. Policy Summary, supra note 658, at 68.
660. Republican Proposal, supra note 658, at 51.






emerge as some form of compromise between the different 1994 pro-
posals that failed to pass.'
H[. STATUTES AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Antitrust law is established by federal and state statutes and the
case law interpreting them. In addition, the DOJ and the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") apply guidelines tailored to particular
types of circumstances; certain guidelines will be discussed in greater
detail below.1 6 In recent years there has also been a greater effort by
state attorneys general to focus on antitrust issues. The states have
collectively issued their own enforcement guidelines as they have
sought to coordinate enforcement efforts among themselves and with
federal enforcement authorities.
The principal antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act," the Clayton
Act,668 and the Federal Trade Commission Act.669 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies "in re-
straint of trade." 670 Joint action by two or more persons is required to
meet the requirement of a contract, combination, or conspiracy.671
Although this section explicitly prohibits every contract in restraint of
trade, the courts have consistently interpreted it to prohibit only un-
reasonable restraints of trade.672 Section 2 of the Sherman Act pro-
hibits monopolization and attempts, combinations or conspiracies to
monopolize. 673 Unlike section 1, section 2 can be violated by both
unilateral and joint action, and focuses exclusively on the monopoliza-
tion offenses.674 The Sherman Act provides for criminal penalties and
is enforced primarily by the Antitrust Division of the DOJ.675
The section of the Clayton Act most relevant to this discussion of
the information superhighway is section 7. Section 7 prohibits acquisi-
tions of stock or assets that tend to create a monopoly or substantially
665. Interview of Sen. Larry Pressler, Multichannel News, Nov. 28, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
666. See infra parts IV, V.
667. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
668. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 (1994).
669. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994).
670. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994)).
671. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266 (1986); Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
672. See, eg., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-63 (1911) (requiring
a court to exercise its judgment in determining if a case presents an "undue" restraint
of trade).
673. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2,26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1994)).
674. Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 638, at 195.
675. Id at 545.
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lessen competition.676 Other sections of the Clayton Act address price
discrimination, 677 exclusive dealing and tie-ins, 678 and simultaneous
service by persons acting as officers or directors of competing corpora-
tions.679 Government enforcement of the Clayton Act is shared by
the DOJ and the FTC.68° The Clayton Act also empowers any person
who has been injured by any antitrust violation to sue in federal court
for treble damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees.68' Private
parties may thus sue for violations of both the Sherman and Clayton
Acts.68 ' Often it is the threat of such potentially huge civil liability to
private plaintiffs that deters questionable practices.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "[u]nfair
methods of competition... and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce. '683 Section 5 was drafted broadly to allow the
FTC to respond to the varied devised business practices which could
constitute unfair methods of competition. 6 4 Hence, the FTC may
proscribe practices that do not violate the Sherman or Clayton
Acts.685 The scope of section 5 is thus broader than that of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts. Any conduct that violates either the Sherman
or Clayton Act, however, will also violate section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.686 The FTC has sole authority to enforce sec-
tion 5, which confers no private cause of action.687
The Robinson-Patman Act 688 is the statute most frequently used to
attack price discrimination. Although section 1 of the Sherman Act
reaches price discrimination and covers products and services, the
Robinson-Patman Act covers only the sale of goods, and not in-
676. Clayton Act, ch 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1994)).
677. See 15 U.S.C. § 13; infra notes 688-97 and accompanying text.
678. See 15 U.S.C. § 14.
679. See 15 U.S.C. § 19.
680. See Vakerics, supra note 638, § 2.02[2]; Antitrust Law Developments, supra
note 638, at 545.
681. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.
682. Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 638, at 645.
683. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994) (original version at ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914)).
684. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44
(1972).
685. See id. at 239.
686. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344
U.S. 392,395 (1953) ("A device which ... falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman
Act is . . .an 'unfair method of competition' within the meaning of § 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act."); In re Borg-Warner Corp., 101 FTC 863, 940 ("[A]
violation of section 8 [of the Clayton Act] is in itself a violation of section 5 [of the
Federal Trade Commission Act]."), modified, 102 FTC 1164 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds 746 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984).
687. 15 U.S.C. § 45; see Naylor v. Case and McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557, 560-61 (2d
Cir. 1978) (stating that there is no implied private right of action); Fulton v. Hecht,
580 F.2d 1243, 1249 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).




tangibles such as licenses, advertising, and other services.' With re-
spect to information superhighway products, the statute therefore may
or may not be relevant. While it may not apply to services, it could
apply to the hardware aspects of the information superhighway, such
as the sale of network equipment or computer terminals.
The complexity of the Robinson-Patman Act is well known.690 The
key provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act are sections 2(a) through
(f), which are amendments to the Clayton Act.691 Section 2 can there-
fore be enforced by private parties. 692 Section 2(a) of the Act prohib-
its discrimination in pricing between different buyers of goods where
the discrimination may "substantially... lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them." 693 Section 2(f) imposes liability on a buyer where a seller
has violated section 2(a).69
The statute contains three defenses to price discrimination attack
under section 2(a). The most commonly used defense, the "meeting
competition defense," is set forth in section 2(b), and is available
where the discrimination was used "in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor." 69 The "cost justification" defense is
found in section 2(a) itself, allowing price differentials based on "dif-
ferences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities" in which the goods are sold or
delivered to buyers.696 Finally, the "changing conditions" defense also
set forth in section 2(a) allows for price changes in response to chang-
ing conditions in the market for (or the marketability of) the goods.6
689. See, eg., Ambook Enter. v. Tune Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 609-10 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that prohibition of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act
does not apply to the sale of newspaper advertisements), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914(1980).
690. Vakerics, supra note 638, § 8.01 and authorities cited therein.
691. Robinson-Patman Act, § 2(a)-(f), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 13(a)-(f) (1994)).
692. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947).
693. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
694. Id. § 13(f). Other prohibitions under the Robinson-Patman Act include com-
pensation payments "except for services rendered in connection with the sale or
purchase of goods," id § 13(c) (addressing practices like dummy brokerage pay-
ments); payments for services or facilities furnished by buyers in connection with the
processing, handling or sales of goods, unless the payment is available "on propor-
tionally equal terms to all other [competing] customers," id. § 13(d) (addressing prac-
tices like phony promotional allowances); and furnishing services or facilities to
buyers of goods for resale "upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportion-
ally equal terms." Id. § 13(e) (addressing promotional services and facilities).
695. Id. § 13(b).
696. Id. § 13(a).
697. Id. The changing conditions to which the defense might apply may include, for
example, situations in which perishable goods deteriorate, seasonal goods become ob-
solete, or goods are sold in distress sales or sales in discontinuance of the business. Id.
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The FTC shares enforcement authority with the DOJ under the
Robinson-Patman Act.698 While the two agencies, to a great extent,
share concurrent jurisdiction in enforcing the antitrust laws, they will
normally attempt to avoid duplication of effort in any particular in-
stance.699 The agencies have therefore adopted a clearance procedure
requiring each agency to notify the other before opening a formal in-
vestigation.70 0 Because only the DOJ may conduct criminal prosecu-
tions, all matters involving criminal conduct are referred to that
agency. 701 Robinson-Patman matters are, as a matter of practice, re-
ferred to the FTC.7 °2
While the majority of antitrust enforcement occurs at the federal
level, and while private plaintiffs generally assert claims under the fed-
eral statutes, state authorities have increased their enforcement efforts
since the 1970s.7 °3 Various enforcement possibilities at the state level
must be considered by practitioners. State attorneys general have
sued under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act 7°4 for damages and
injunctive relief as private "persons. '70 5 Treble damage suits have
sought recovery where the state has been a purchaser of products and
services, often to recover overcharges resulting from price fixing con-
spiracies.706 Second, Title III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976707 conferred parens patriae authority so that
state attorneys general could sue for treble damages for injuries to
natural persons residing in the state.70 8 Third, the Multistate Antitrust
Task Force of the National Association of Attorneys General
("NAAG") coordinates multistate investigations and litigation70 9 and
698. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 21a.
699. See Vakerics, supra note 638, § 2.01.
700. Id.; Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 638, at 547.
701. Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 638, at 547.
702. Id.
703. Lifland, supra note 638, § 1.04.
704. Clayton Act, §§ 4, 16, 38 Stat. 730, 731, 737 (1914) (current versions at 15
U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1994)).
705. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) (holding that
a state can sue in a non-proprietary capacity for antitrust violations).
706. See, e.g., New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d 1065, 1079-80 (2d Cir.)(holding that state may recover overcharges under § 4 of the Clayton Act where the
state has suffered injury due to price fixing), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988).
707. 15 U.S.C. § 15c-h (1994) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 94-435, title III,
§ 301, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976)).
708. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1). Such actions may only be brought for violations of the
Sherman Act, however. Id. Other limitations also apply to such suits. See Antitrust
Law Developments, supra note 638, at 607.
709. See, e.g., Maryland v. Mitsubishi Elecs. America, 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,743 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 1992) (illustrating a multistate antitrust litigation); New York
v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same). The states
also share information and otherwise coordinate investigations of proposed mergers
and acquisitions pursuant to the NAAG Voluntary Pre-Merger Disclosure Compact,
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,410, at 21,209 (Mar. 21, 1994).
816 [Vol. 64
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states' participation as amicus curiae in major antitrust cases. °
Fourth, NAAG has adopted enforcement guidelines that reflect
NAAG's and its members' enforcement policies. The NAAG Vertical
Restraint Guidelines,71' adopted in 1985 and revised in 1995, address
resale price maintenance and nonprice vertical restraints. The NAAG
Horizontal Merger Guidelines were adopted in 1987 and revised in
1993.7 The state attorneys general, the DOJ, and the FTC also coor-
dinate overlapping state and federal enforcement efforts by sharing
resources and information to avoid duplication.1 3
The practitioner must also consider the various state antitrust stat-
utes. Almost every state has a statute of general application to undue
restrictions of competition. 1 Approximately thirty of these statutes
contain language tracking that of the Sherman Act, and many are
much more specific than the Sherman Act itself.715 Many track lan-
guage of the Clayton Act.71 6 State laws have also been enacted with
language paralleling section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.7 17 Thus, if a practice or transaction involves the commerce of
multiple states, several state statutes may be implicated and several
state enforcement agencies may express interest in the matter.
Within this statutory framework, the practitioner must understand
the basic analytical approaches that have developed in the antitrust
field. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the inquiry into the unrea-
sonableness of any particular restraint of trade is determined by its
effect on competition.1 8 This determination traditionally has turned
on a distinction between two analytical approaches to challenged con-
duct. In the approach known as the per se rule, conduct that has been
traditionally thought to be the most obviously pernicious-that is, al-
ways or almost always anticompetitive-has been held illegal under a
710. 60 Minutes With the Honorable Miciael F. Brockmeyer, Chief, Antitrust Divi-
sion, Office ofAttorney Genera; Maryland, 59 Antitrust LJ. 25,31 (1990) [hereinafter
Brockmeyer].
711. Reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,400, at 21,151 (Mar. 27, 1995).
712. NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1993), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,406, at 21,193 (Mar. 30, 1993) [hereinafter NAAG Guidelines]; see infra
part IV.
713. Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 638, at 618; Brockneyer, supra note
710, at 32.




718. See, eg., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988)
(holding that economic consequences, rather than particular agreements, must be
considered to determine unreasonable restraint of trade); National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) ("[Tlhe purpose of the analy-
sis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to
decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest ....").
1995]
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rule of per se illegality.719 The practical import of the per se approach
is that once the pernicious conduct or practice is identified, its illegal-
ity follows as a matter of law without any in-depth analysis of justifica-
tions for the conduct or of the economic characteristics of the relevant
market.720 Accordingly, per se condemnation is reserved for re-
straints with which courts have considerable experience and whose ef-
fects are well known.721 The per se rule has generally been applied to
price fixing by competitors,722 market allocations among competi-
tors, 723 certain concerted refusals to deal,724 resale price mainte-
72572nance, and certain tying arrangements.726 The per se category of
conduct hence includes essentially all arrangements between competi-
tors that restrain competition and certain price arrangements between
non-competitors.
719. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984); National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 & n.16 (1977);
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
720. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
721. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963).
722. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940)(holding that a price fixing agreement is a per se violation of the Sherman Act);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) (same).
723. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (per curiam)
(holding that per se rule applies to potential as well as actual competitors); Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. at 606 (1972) (holding that per se rule applies to any scheme divid-
ing up a market, even if it benefits only a specific level of the market).
724. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493
U.S. 411, 432 (1990) (holding that per se rule may be applicable to lawyers' concerted
refusal to represent indigent clients without increased compensation); Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1986) (holding that per se
rule may be applicable to dentists' concerted refusal to submit x-rays to dental insur-
ers for use in benefits determinations); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 n.6 (1985) (stating that a "concerted
refusal to deal... might justify a per se invalidation"). Concerted refusals to deal are
also known as group boycotts.
725. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (holding that maintaining
a specified resale price was a per se illegal restraint of trade); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (finding that minimum prices were a
restraint of trade); see also Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
720, 724 (1988) (discussing previous cases in which per se rule has applied to resale
price maintenance). Resale price maintenance is price fixing between persons at dif-
ferent levels of the market structure, such as manufacturers and distributors, regard-
ing the resale price of products or services. See Antitrust Law Developments, supra
note 638, at 100.
726. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992);
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984); Fortner Enters. v.
United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969). In a tying arrangement a
party sells a product (the tying product), but only on condition that the buyer also
buys a second (tied) product or agrees not to buy the tied product from another sup-
plier. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6. The Court in Jefferson
Parish, however, noted that tying arrangements not meeting the per se liability criteria
are analyzed under the rule of reason. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17-18. The rule of
reason is discussed below, infra notes 727-31 and accompanying text.
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The other analytical approach is known as the rule of reason and is
considered the general rule of antitrust analysis. The Supreme Court
held early on that section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits only undue
restraints of trade. 7 Under this approach, all practices other than
those in the per se category (which are presumed to be unreasonable)
are examined under the rule of reason to determine whether the chal-
lenged practice is "reasonable." The application of the rule of reason
is actually a process in which the courts go beyond the initial identifi-
cation of the practice (or "restraint" in Sherman Act parlance) to
delve into its economic or other justifications and the detailed charac-
teristics of the relevant market in which that practice is used. In so
doing, courts consider the facts peculiar to the industry involved, the
industry's condition before and after the restraint was imposed, the
nature of the restraint and its actual or probable effect, and the re-
straint's history, perceived evil, and purpose rZ
In reviewing these factors, courts attempt to weigh the procompeti-
tive effects of the practice against its perceived harms to competi-
tion.729 If the former outweighs the latter, the practice is considered
reasonable and will not result in liability; if there are few procompeti-
rive effects of the restraint, it will likely be condemned as "unreasona-
ble."730 The rule of reason approach is generally applied to nonprice
vertical restraints (i.e., between parties who are not in a competitive
relationship with each other, such as a supplier and customer).73 Be-
cause the analytical consequences of the per se-rule of reason distinc-
tion are potentially so drastically different, enforcement agencies and
private litigants have traditionally invested great effort in characteriz-
ing a practice so as to fall within or without each approach.
Another traditional characterization issue related to the per se-rule
of reason distinction is the structural nature of the restraint being
challenged. Restraints exerted by market participants who compete
with each other or function at the same distribution level of the mar-
ket (such as two manufacturers, two wholesalers, etc.), or which affect
competition at that level of the market, are called "horizontal" re-
straints. For example, agreements by manufacturers to limit output or
to fix prices are horizontal restraints. Horizontal restraints are tradi-
tionally perceived as the most harmful to competition and are sub-
jected to the per se rule of illegality.73
In contrast, restraints employed by market participants at more
than one distribution level of the market (such as a manufacturer and
727. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
728. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
729. See id; National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
691 (1978).
730. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see Seagood
Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F2d 1555, 1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991).
731. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977).
732. Vakerics, supra note 638, § 1.03[2].
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its retail dealers, or a supplier and its customer) or which affect the
relationship between the participants at the different distribution
levels are called "vertical" restraints and rarely trigger per se analy-
sis. 733 Examples of vertical restraints are territorial and customer re-
strictions imposed on dealers by manufacturers, exclusive
distributorships, exclusive dealing, and other restrictions designed to
market sellers' goods in a manageable or efficient manner.
Commentators and courts have recognized that there may be diffi-
culties in differentiating vertical from horizontal restraints.73 The
Supreme Court has suggested that the characterization depends on
the relationship between the parties rather than on the purpose or
effect of the restraint. 735 Any situation involving parties in a vertical
relationship, however, may still involve a horizontal restraint if there
are multiple conspirators at the same distribution level.736
The treatment of horizontal restraints as more harmful than vertical
restraints is related to the fact that the antitrust laws are primarily
concerned with interbrand competition.737 Interbrand competition is
competition between products made by different manufacturers or be-
tween services rendered by different service providers (IBM computer
software and Microsoft software, for example).738 Intrabrand compe-
tition is competition between two dealers of the same manufacturer's
product (stores selling IBM software).739 Vertical restrictions limit in-
trabrand competition in the manufacturer's goods so that the manu-
facturer can achieve efficiencies in its distribution, thus promoting
interbrand competition between the manufacturer's goods and those
of other manufacturers. 740 If there are numerous competing brands in
the marketplace, then no single manufacturer can exert significant
market power over price, and a vertical restraint imposed by a single
manufacturer on its dealers will be unlikely to do great competitive
733. See Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 57 (refusing to extend the per se rule to verti-
cal restrictions of territory in retail franchising arrangements).
734. Id. at 58 n.28; Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 638, at 60 & n.324.
735. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 & n.4 (1988)
(rejecting terminated dealer's argument that restraint was horizontal; the Court
stated, "The dissent apparently believes that whether a restraint is horizontal depends
upon whether its anticompetitive effects are horizontal, and not upon whether it is the
product of a horizontal agreement. That is of course a conceivable way of talking, but
if it were the language of antitrust analysis there would be no such thing as an unlaw-
ful vertical restraint, since all anticompetitive effects are by definition horizontal ef-
fects." (citation omitted)).
736. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 144-45 (1966) (hold-
ing that a corporation and three dealers participated in a conspiracy against discount
dealers); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209-12 (1959) (ana-
lyzing an alleged conspiracy by department stores, manufacturers, and distributors
against a retail store owner).
737. See Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19 (discussing interbrand competition).
738. See Vakerics, supra note 638, § 7.01.
739. Id.
740. Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 54.
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harm. This is true because interbrand competition confronting the
manufacturer can check the exploitation of intrabrand market power,
as a result of consumers' ability to substitute a different brand of the
same product.741 If vigorous interbrand competition is absent, on the
other hand, the antitrust laws will be more concerned with the extent
of competition between dealers of the same product. Thus, in situa-
tions involving vertical nonprice restrictions, for example, rule of rea-
son analysis requires the factfinder to balance intrabrand and
interbrand competitive effects to determine the restriction's net com-
petitive impact.74
The horizontal-vertical and per se-rule of reason distinctions often
afford antitrust practitioners considerable opportunity for creativity
and argument. In any given market situation, a practice may have
both horizontal and vertical characteristics or effects on competition.
Practitioners involved in establishing multiparty distribution systems
and the various types of strategic alliances designed to serve (or serve
as) the information superhighway should bear this in mind. In recent
years there has been a trend by the courts to apply per se analysis to
fewer and fewer practices, or at least with greater and greater cau-
tion.743 The courts have become more receptive to, and more sophis-
ticated in addressing, economic theory and proof as applied to the
factual scenarios presented to them. Accordingly, courts will likely
examine the economic particularities of the situation at issue when the
rule of reason applies.
A knowledge of the detailed economic effects of any particular re-
straint or transaction will therefore be crucial to resolving an informa-
tion superhighway issue against antitrust standards. The competitive
environment of many of the high technology industries related to the
information superhighway is changing monthly, because of the
proliferation of products and services and the joint ventures and other
businesses organized to deliver them. The telecommunications and
computer industries are the most obvious examples. The dynamic na-
ture of information superhighway developments poses a challenge for
any court, agency, or practitioner seeking to discern the competitive
effects of challenged conduct.7 "
741. Id. at 52 n.19.
742. See id. at 49-54, 57 n.27.
743. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284,295,297 (1985); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,34-35
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Antitrust Law Developments, supra note
638, at 37-41 and cases collected at 37 n.224.
744. An unreasonable restraint under section 1 of the Sherman Act, as described
above, may also be challenged as part of a monopolization charge under section 2 of
the Sherman Act. See Vakerics, supra note 386, § 5.06. The analytical inquiry in such
cases involves a determination whether the defendant has monopoly power, the
power to exclude competitors or control prices in a relevant market. United States v.
E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); see Walker Process Equip.,
Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). This is generally deter-
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With this background in mind, the next parts of the Report will dis-
cuss some of the issues that may arise in thinking about the informa-
tion superhighway and related current events.
III. ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
Many of the policy issues concerning the information superhighway
involve how market players will establish and finance potentially com-
plex and expansive technological infrastructures. Such infrastructures
may involve networks or distribution systems costing immense sums
invested over long periods. One doctrine that often arises under the
monopolization offenses of section 2 of the Sherman Act is the mo-
nopolization theory known as the essential facilities doctrine. 745
The doctrine applies to a situation where a firm with an essential
facility refuses to deal with another party by refusing that party access
to the facility. Where a competitor needs a particular facility or re-
source to compete effectively with the firm controlling the facility or
resource, the controlling firm has an obligation to provide competitors
with reasonable access to the facility.74  The harm in refusing such
access is the extension of a monopolist's monopoly power from one
market to another, or from one stage of production to another.747 To
prevail under the essential facilities doctrine, the competitor who is
denied access must be unable practically or reasonably to duplicate
the facility, and it must be feasible for the controlling firm to provide
it access.748
An essential facilities analysis is potentially extremely complex and
uncertain, particularly in high technology network industries. The fa-
cility itself, its essential nature, and the market in which competition is
allegedly hindered must be defined.749 Feasibility of facility duplica-
tion raises particular uncertainty, as courts must determine the
amount of expense that an access-seeking competitor must invest in
duplication before the firm controlling the facility will be required to
mined by reference to the defendant's market share. Antitrust Law Developments,
supra note 638, at 212-14. Other factors, such as barriers to entry in the market, regu-
lation of the industry, levels of profitability, the size of the defendant in terms of its
sales and assets, and the defendant's size relative to other firms in the industry, are
also considered tautological. The courts will apply a rule of reason analysis. See, e.g.,
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 452, 457 (1920) (using a rule
of reason analysis).




748. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570
F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
749. See Alan L. Silverstein, Essential Facilities and Refusals to Deal in Network
Industries Facing Rapid Technological Change, Antitrust Rep., Sept. 1995, at 3, 3-8.
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make it available.750 Even where access is provided to the facility,
there can be considerable debate whether the terms and conditions of
access are reasonable.751 In regulated industries, regulatory consider-
ations related to this issue may further complicate the analysis and
possibly impose inappropriate regulatory functions on courts. Par-
ticularly in industries where technological change is rapid, the charac-
ter of the facility (for example, a tangible wire network or an
intangible network database), the ways in which competitors may du-
plicate portions of the facility, and the access points to the facility may
change frequently.753 Careful review of essential facilities allegations
on a case-by- case basis will thus become more crucial as technological
change occurs with greater frequency and becomes the rule rather
than the exception.
Frms that control any of the types of "pipelines" or unique re-
sources that are developed in constructing the information superhigh-
way, then, must be vigilant in making their decisions about which
competitors will be granted and denied access to these resources. The
local exchange telephone networks controlled by the Regional Bell
Operating Companies commonly have been thought of as essential
facilities. The requirements of the essential facilities doctrine, how-
ever, could apply to many other types of industries and facilities, such
as operators of electronic networks, owners or processors of informa-
tion designed to be transmitted on such networks, and others. To the
extent that the firms likely to establish such pipelines or resources at
the beginning will have substantial financial resources, while other
market players will likely not have such financial means, the pipelines
or resources may not be reasonably duplicable by the other market
players. Of course, one possible response to the risk imposed by the
essential facilities doctrine on a dominant firm is to adopt a policy of
reasonable and open access to the facility in question, in the expecta-
tion that open access will ultimately produce more profits than any
monopoly profits arising from denial of access to the facility.
Another point to bear in mind is that for many people the image of
the information superhighway is a single pipeline. While there may be
few pipelines given that their construction will be expensive and com-
plex, over time we should expect to see multiple pipelines and multi-
ple types of pipelines. Where once telephone companies were a sole
pipeline for telecommunications, today cable companies and electric
utilities, firms able to build fiber optic networks, and operators of Per-
sonal Communications Services and other wireless systems are using
converging technologies and technological advances to expand the
750. Id. at 4-5.
751. 1d at 5.
752. Id.
753. Id. at 6-7.
1995]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
universe of available networks. 4 Some may fail in the marketplace
over time, and some may not be deployed equally throughout the
country or the world, but to the extent that they increase in number,
the "essential" nature of any initial or long-standing pipeline may di-
minish. At the same time, one type of network may have cost advan-
tages that are so significant that the developing pipelines in the
market cannot easily become practical substitutes for it.
IV. MERGERS
This part will discuss agency and judicial treatment of basic horizon-
tal and vertical mergers, including developments in recent transac-
tions, and how the concern for innovation may inform merger
counseling on the information superhighway.
A. Horizontal Mergers
On a daily basis, firms combine to offer new products and services
in new ways, often through innovations in technology. Telecommuni-
cations and technology have been at the core of recent merger activ-
ity. How are the competitive effects of such combinations assessed?
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions of stock or assets
where the effect of the acquisition "may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. '755 This is a civil prohi-
bition rather than a criminal one. Such actions are brought by federal
and state enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs to enjoin the
closing of the transaction, or to undo closed transactions through or-
ders of rescission and divestiture.756 Mergers can also be challenged
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 757 and section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.758 The principal focus of merger
analysis under the antitrust laws is the horizontal transaction, which
occurs between two direct competitors in the same market.75 9 Merg-
ers of direct competitors reduce the number of competitors in the
market by one, and thereby increases the market share of the merged
entity.
In 1992, the DOJ and the FTC issued joint horizontal merger guide-
lines ("1992 Guidelines") to modify earlier agency guidelines and pro-
754. Id. at 7.
755. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994) (original version § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914)).
756. See, e.g., California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 285 (1990) (finding
that a private plaintiff may seek divestiture for enforcement of the Clayton Act).
757. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570, 575-76 (1966) (up-
holding district court ruling that merger had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 671-72 (1964) (hold-
ing that merger of two large banks constituted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act).
758. Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 638, at 276.
759. See Vakerics, supra note 638, §§ 9.02, 9.04[1].
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vide further guidance to the business community.76° The 1992
Guidelines are not binding, although they may influence the courts. 761
A review of the 1992 Guidelines will help practitioners recognize
which mergers will likely be challenged by federal enforcement
agencies.
The first step in analyzing the effects of a proposed merger is to
define the relevant market implicated by the transaction. The agen-
cies assess whether the merger would significantly increase concentra-
tion and result in a concentrated market27 The first aspect of
defining the relevant market, in turn, is defining the product or ser-
vice.763 The relevant market includes all products that are reasonably
interchangeable with those of the merging companies.7' The agen-
cies begin by narrowly defining the products sold by the merging
firms. They then expand the product definition to include all other
products that would become acceptable substitutes to buyers if prices
for the products were increased by a "small but significant and non-
transitory" amount.765 The reactions of buyers to the price increase
are examined by assessing evidence that buyers shifted to other prod-
ucts or that sellers base their business decisions on the prospects that
buyers may switch to other products.76 Substitutable products are
added to the tentatively defined market until the agencies determine
that for the expanded defined market a hypothetical monopolist over
all the products could profitably impose a small but significant and
nontransitory price increase. 767
Substitutability or interchangeability of products is of course depen-
dent on the preferences of consumers. Advances in technology, and
particularly the convergence of technologies that has sparked much of
the popular discussion of the information superhighway, certainly af-
fect such preferences because they add products and services to the
array from which consumers already choose. Any discussion about
the information superhighway is at least implicitly also a discussion
about changes in a social phenomenon. Consumer preferences may
change as consumer attitudes about technology and the uses to which
it can be applied change. We have already witnessed such preference
changes in daily life. Computers, software, electronic databases, and
on-line electronic bulletin boards today are now readily accepted by
760. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, at 20,569 (Apr. 2,
1992) [hereinafter 1992 Guidelines].
761. Vakerics, supra note 638, § 9.0411]; see also United States v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 567 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the 1982 Guidelines are "help-
ful" to a court in analyzing the legality of a merger), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
762. 1992 Guidelines, supra note 760, § 0.2.
763. Id. § 1.1.






millions for work and play. The definitional boundaries of the mar-
kets these products inhabit have changed with greater acceptance of
their potential by consumers.
Having defined the product or service market, the enforcement
agencies then use a similar method to define the geographic market
implicated by the transaction.76 Starting with a geographic area that
includes the locations of the merging firms, the market definition is
expanded to include locations of other firms that would serve the
merging firms' customers if the merging firms raised prices by a "small
but significant and nontransitory" amount.769 When this process of
expanding the definition of the geographic market reaches a point at
which a hypothetical monopolist over all locations in the market can
profitably impose such a price increase in the product, the geographic
market is defined.77 ° The agencies consider evidence that buyers have
shifted suppliers in response to price changes and evidence that sellers
base their business decisions on the prospect of buyer substitution be-
tween geographic locations in response to price changes.771
Next, the agencies identify the firms that participate in the relevant
market. Included will be all firms that currently produce or sell in the
relevant market, and, to the extent they are competitively significant,
vertically integrated firms. 7 72 Firms that do not currently produce or
sell in the market will also be included if they are "uncommitted en-
trants"-that is, if in response to a price increase, they likely could
enter the market by changing production within one year "without the
expenditure of significant sunk costs of entry and exit. 773
After the market participants are identified, their market shares are
calculated based on their total sales or capacity, usually measured on
an annual basis. 7 Market shares are then used to calculate the con-
centration of the market through the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
("HHI") in order to assess whether the increase in concentration after
the merger will be significant.775 The HHI is calculated by summing
the squares of each market participant's market share, both before
and after the merger.776 The agencies consider both the post-merger
market concentration and the increase in concentration that the trans-
768. Id. § 1.2.
769. Id. § 1.21.
770. Id.
771. Id.
772. Id. § 1.31.
773. Id. § 1.32. The 1992 Guidelines define sunk costs as acquisition costs of tangi-
ble and intangible assets-such as market-specific investments in technologies, re-
search and development, and regulatory approvals-that cannot be recovered by the
deployment of those assets outside the relevant market. Id.
774. Id. § 1.41. A firm's sales or capacity is not included to the extent that it would
not be available to respond to an increase in price in the market. Id. Market shares
are calculated for foreign firms for their domestic sales. Id. § 1.43.




action produces."7  Where the post-merger HHI is 1000 or less, the
market is deemed unconcentrated and the transaction will not likely
be challenged." 8 Where the post-merger HHI is 1000-1800, the mar-
ket is deemed "moderately concentrated," and if the increase over the
pre-merger HI is 100 or greater, then an agency challenge is more
likely." 9 Finally, markets with post-merger HHIs above 1800 are re-
garded as highly concentrated.7" In such markets, if the HM in-
crease is 50 or more, agency challenge is much more likely, and where
the increase is more than 100, the merger is presumed to enhance
market power and probably will be challenged absent special
circumstances.781
After assessing market share and concentration, the agencies assess
other market factors that pertain to the competitive effects of a
merger. For example, post-merger firm and product homogeneity and
the availability to firms of information about the market may make it
easier for firms in the post-merger market to engage in collusion that
could harm consumers. Such information can be used to detect and
punish firms' deviations from collusive arrangements. 7s z There may
also exist aspects of product differentiation, capacity, and other mar-
ket conditions that would allow the merged entity to elevate price and
suppress output unilaterally.783
Another important market characteristic is the ease of entry into
the post-merger market. The merger raises no antitrust concern
where entry is sufficiently timely, likely, and of such magnitude that
post-merger market firms could not, singly or collectively, profitably
maintain a price increase above pre-merger levels. 7 4
The agencies will consider whether a new entrant can achieve a sig-
nificant market impact within two years through any entry effort.7
Because entry that is sufficient to counteract the competitive concerns
raised by the merger will cause prices to fall to pre-merger levels or
lower, the agencies will look to see whether the entrant can attain




781. Id. The enforcement agencies will consider whether the shares are over or
understated as a result of recent or ongoing changes in market conditions. Id. § 1.52.
Where, for example, technology that is needed for competitive viability is not equally
available to all firms in the market, then the shares of firms to which it is not available
may be overstated. Id. § 1.521.
782. Id §§ 2.1-2.12.
783. Id. §§ 2.2-2.22.
784. Id. § 3.0.
785. Id. § 3.2. The agencies consider all phases of the entry process, including plan-
ning and design, licensing, construction/operation of production facilities, promotion




entry that is profitable at pre-merger price levels.786 The agencies will
also consider whether mergers that might otherwise be challenged
may be necessary to achieve certain efficiencies such as economies of
scale, better integration of production facilities, lower transportation
costs, and the like.787 Lastly, mergers involving failing companies that
can show, among other requirements, that the failing firm's assets
would exit the relevant market absent the acquisition, are unlikely to
enhance market power and thus will not be challenged.78
Over the years, the courts have also taken a more sophisticated eco-
nomic approach to evaluating horizontal mergers. They have required
that the definitions of both product and geographic markets be com-
mercially realistic and economically significant.789  The Supreme
Court's criteria for product definition have included the perception of
the product market as a separate economic entity, the product's pecu-
liar characteristics or uses, the sensitivity of the product to price
changes in similar products, whether unique manufacturing facilities
are required to make the product, whether users of the product are a
distinct class of customers, and whether the product is sold through
distinct distribution channels.79° These criteria are used in comparing
the merging firms' products with other products that may compete
with them.79 The products that are ultimately included in the market
are those which are reasonably interchangeable with the merging
786. Id. §§ 3.0-3.4.
787. Id. § 4.
788. Id. §§ 5.0-5.1. Because of the increases in state merger enforcement in recent
years, practitioners need also consider the horizontal merger guidelines issued by
NAAG. NAAG Guidelines, supra note 712. Under the NAAG Guidelines the states
generally evaluate mergers in the same way as the federal agencies do. Neal R. Stoll
& Shepard Goldfein, State Merger Enforcement in the '90s, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 20, 1993, at
3. Relevant product and geographic markets are defined, and market concentration
and changes in concentration are assessed before and after the proposed transaction.
Id. To determine whether the merger is likely substantially to lessen competition,
attorneys general examine the concentration data in light of the ease of entry, the
history of anticompetitive behavior in the industry, the efficiencies the merger may
produce, and the effect of powerful buyers in the market. Id.
Market definition, however, differs somewhat from the federal guidelines. The
product market includes the common products of the merging firms and substitute
products, but substitutes are included only if 75% of consumers find them "suitable."
Id. This method could result in narrower product markets than under federal guide-
lines. The geographic market is defined as the locations from which 75% of consum-
ers would obtain the product. Id. The NAAG Guidelines are less likely to include
potential competitors as being in the relevant market. Another significant difference
is that while the NAAG Guidelines employ the same HHI thresholds as the federal
guidelines do, they use the thresholds to create presumptions of anticompetitive ef-
fects; the presumptions are much more difficult for merging firms to overcome than
under the federal guidelines, partly because the NAAG Guidelines set forth fewer
factors upon which the firms can rely in overcoming the presumptions. Id.
789. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-26, 336-39 (1962).




firms' products.7 m Substitution flexibility by producers of other prod-
ucts is considered as well.793 The same criteria are applied to define
the geographic market,79 which will include the area to which pur-
chasers can practically turn for supplies. 795
After defining the market, the courts focus on market share and
market concentration to determine the competitive impact of the
merger.7 96 If the merging firms' market shares and market concentra-
tion are sufficiently high, a prima facie case of illegality under the
Clayton Act will be established.797 The presumption of illegality may,
however, be rebutted by evidence of other factors demonstrating that
the market statistics do not accurately reflect the competitive condi-
tions in the industry.798 Factors considered include barriers to entry,
decreasing market shares of the merging firms, a history of mergers in
the industry, trends toward increasing or decreasing concentration,
the existence of excess capacity in the industry, the acquired firm's
financial weakness, the rate of technological innovation in the indus-
try and the technological capability of the acquired firm, and the role
of the acquired firm as a particularly disruptive factor in the
market 79
B. Vertical Mergers
Vertical mergers are mergers between firms having a supplier-cus-
tomer or other vertical relationship.800 The traditional antitrust con-
cern with such mergers was that they could eliminate either a source
of supply or a buyer that is critical to the competitive viability of the
remaining firms in the market.80' Where a customer acquires a sup-
plier, for example, other customers may be foreclosed from a supply
source that is necessary for them to compete with the acquiring
firm.0 The Supreme Court has articulated this foreclosure con-
792. Id
793. Id. at 325 n.42.
794. Id. at 336; see Vakerics, supra note 638, § 9.05[1][c].
795. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 358-59, 358 n.35
(1963).
796. See FTC v. Bass Brothers Enter., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,041, at 68,605
(N.D. Ohio June 6, 1984).
797. See Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363. In United States v. Von's Gro-
cery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), for example, the merger was held illegal where the
combined market share of the merged firms was 7.5% in an industry with a trend
toward increasing concentration. Id. at 272-73, 279.
798. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-98 (1974).
799. Vakerics, supra note 638, § 9.05[2] and cases collected therein.
800. Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 638, at 330.
801. See Vakerics, supra note 638, § 9.05[3].
802. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 574 (1972); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-24.
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cern, 80 3 but lower courts have subsequently viewed vertical mergers
with less suspicion.80 4
The lower courts' skepticism of the traditional antitrust concern was
reflected in a limited view of the possible anticompetitive effects of
vertical mergers, as articulated in federal merger enforcement guide-
lines issued in 1984 (the "1984 Guidelines"). 8 5 The 1984 Guidelines
essentially focus on two harms in evaluating the two markets in which
the two merging firms compete: the creation of barriers to entry and
the potential facilitation of horizontal collusion.
A vertical merger may increase entry barriers when three necessary
(but not sufficient) conditions exist. First, the vertical integration be-
tween the two markets must be so extensive that entrants to one mar-
ket (the "primary market," where competition is being evaluated)
would simultaneously have to enter the "second" or adjacent mar-
ket. 16 The second necessary condition occurs where the requirement
of entry to the secondary market makes entry to the primary market
"significantly more difficult and less likely to occur."8°7 Finally, the
characteristics of the primary market must be "otherwise so conducive
to noncompetitive performance that the increased difficulty of entry is
likely to affect its performance. '80 8
The DOJ will ordinarily examine a broad range of criteria to deter-
mine whether these three conditions exist and whether barriers to en-
try are consequently created. The criteria include unintegrated
capacity in the secondary market, the ease of entering the secondary
market in absolute terms, the skills required of firms in the two mar-
kets, the recoverability of capital assets that may be specialized to the
secondary market, and the concentration of the primary market.80 9
As to the possibility that the vertical merger will facilitate horizon-
tal collusion, the 1984 Guidelines note that vertical integration by up-
803. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323-24.
804. See Alberta Gas Chemicals Ltd. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d
1235, 1244-45 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Fruehauf Corp. v.
FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979); O'Neill v. Coca-Cola Co., 669 F. Supp. 217,
224 (N.D. IM. 1987); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp.
1360, 1489 (D. Kan. 1987), aff'd in part, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
1005 (1990).
805. See Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 1 13,103, at 20,551 § 4 (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Guidelines]; see
also Scott A. Stempel, Moving Beyond the '84 Guidelines: Government Shows In-
creasing Concern with Vertical Mergers, Antitrust, Fall 1994, at 17 (noting that the
1984 Guidelines "reflect[ ] a very narrow view of the circumstances in which the gov-
ernment should challenge vertical mergers"). Although the 1984 Guidelines were su-
perseded by the 1992 Guidelines (discussed above with respect to horizontal
mergers), the federal enforcement agencies still rely on the 1984 Guidelines with re-
spect to vertical mergers.
806. 1984 Guidelines, supra note 805, § 4.21.
807. Id.
808. Id.
809. Id. §§ 4.211-4.213.
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stream firms into the associated retail market can facilitate collusion
in the upstream market by making it easier for the firms to monitor
retail prices.810 This is true because retail prices are generally more
visible than prices in upstream markets. As vertical integration in-
creases, the monitoring effect may become significant."1 ' The DOJ
will thus challenge vertical mergers when the upstream market is con-
centrated at an HM value above 1800 and a large percentage of up-
stream product will be sold through vertically integrated retail outlets
after the merger.8 12
The 1984 Guidelines also observe that a vertical merger that elimi-
nates a "particularly disruptive buyer" in a downstream market may
facilitate collusion in the upstream market.813 Where, for example,
sales to a particular buyer are viewed by upstream firms as sufficiently
important and the upstream firms collude, those firms may deviate
from collusive agreements to obtain the sales from that buyer. A ver-
tical merger of that buyer with an upstream firm, however, will elimi-
nate the incentive to deviate from collusive efforts. Such a scenario
would make it easier for upstream firms to collude.814 The DOJ will
challenge a vertical merger on this basis when the upstream market is
concentrated at an BHI value of 1800 or more and the disruptive
buyer substantially differs from the other firms in its market in terms
of volume of purchases or other relevant characteristics. 81 5
Because vertical mergers in recent years were largely viewed as effi-
cient and procompetitive, until 1994 few were challenged under the
1984 Guidelines. 6 In 1994, however, the DOJ challenged three nota-
ble vertical mergers in the telecommunications and cable industries,
relying at least in part on theories not articulated by the 1984 Guide-
lines. Commentators have suggested that such efforts indicate a shift
away from the view that vertical mergers are generally
procompefitive.8 17
The DOJ challenged AT&T's proposed purchase of McCaw Cellu-
lar Communications under section 7 of the Clayton Act, alleging that
the purchase would lessen competition in the markets for cellular ser-
vice, cellular infrastructure equipment, and long distance service to
cellular subscribers.81 8 AT&T was alleged to be the dominant sup-
plier of cellular infrastructure equipment in the country, a market
where only two other competitors existed.1 Because buyers of cellu-
810. Id § 4.221.
811. Id.
812. Ld.
813. Id. § 4.222.
814. Id.
815. I.
816. Stempel, supra note 805, at 18.
817. Id at 18-21.
818. United States v. AT&T Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158, at 44,166 (Aug. 26, 1994).
819. Id. (Competitive Impact Statement).
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lar equipment practically get locked into their suppliers, AT&T had
substantial market power over its installed base of customers.12 0 Be-
cause there was no effective competition in McCaw's cellular markets
and AT&T dominated long distance service to cellular subscribers, the
markets at issue were highly concentrated. 2
The DOJ alleged that the merger could harm competition in three
ways. First, AT&T's market power in the equipment market would
allow the merged firm to disadvantage the cellular equipment custom-
ers that competed with McCaw by raising their costs and limiting their
capacity and service quality.82s Second, the merger would afford
AT&T an unfair advantage over competitors in the long distance ser-
vice market because McCaw could dictate to its customers the choice
of long distance provider. The merged firm could offer customers
bundled cellular and long distance service, foreclosing other long dis-
tance providers from access to those customers and potentially result-
ing in higher prices paid by those customers. 3 Third, the DOJ feared
that AT&T somehow could use proprietary information of its equip-
ment competitors, if those competitors supplied equipment to McCaw
and transmitted proprietary information to McCaw in the process. 8 4
The proposed consent decree imposed requirements on the firms to
act as if they were not related. Under its terms, AT&T was forced to
offer McCaw and its cellular service competitors similar terms for
AT&T's infrastructure equipment.825 The decree also required that
AT&T help customers to change infrastructure suppliers. 6 McCaw
was required to provide equal access to long distance competitors of
AT&T and to keep confidential from AT&T the proprietary informa-
tion it received from other infrastructure equipment suppliers. s 7
Similarly, the DOJ also challenged British Telecommunications'
("British Telecom") acquisition of twenty percent of MCI Communi-
cations.828 Alleging a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, the
DOJ argued that British Telecom had an effective bottleneck monop-
oly over United Kingdom telecommunications services, was the domi-
nant provider of domestic long distance services in the U.K., and had
market power in the provision of international long distance services
820. Id. at 44,168.
821. Id. at 44,168-69.
822. Id. at 44,166.
823. Id. at 44,168-69.
824. Id. at 44,168.
825. Id. at 44,164 (Proposed Final Judgment).
826. Id. at 44,164-65.
827. Id. at 44,162-63.




in the U.K." 9 MCI was alleged to be the second largest United States
provider of U.S.-U.K. international telecommunications services.m
The harm threatened by the transaction was that British Telecom's
investment in MCI gave it an incentive to use its market power in
U.K. telecommunications services to favor MCI and disadvantage
MCI's competitors that provided U.S.-U.K. telecommunications serv-
ices." 1 Because British Telecom could discriminate in favor of MCI
with respect to prices, terms, and access to British Telecom's interna-
tional services, MCI's competitors' offerings would be less attractive
and their ability to compete would thereby suffer.831
The DOJ was also concerned that MCI's competitors would be dis-
advantaged because British Telecom could provide MCI with advance
information about changes to its network.833 An additional concern
was the risk that British Telecom would receive proprietary informa-
tion about MCI's competitors when it provided them with U.S.-U.K.
services, and British Telecom could provide such information to MCI.
MCI's access to such information thus posed an increased risk of col-
lusion between MCI and its competitors.A
The proposed consent decree therefore required British Telecom
and MCI to disclose in the United States detailed information about
the terms and conditions of British Telecom's services provided to
MCI.8 35 It also banned British Telecom's disclosure to MCI of confi-
dential information about MCI's competitors.Y
The DOJ also challenged the proposed cable industry merger of
Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI") with Liberty Media Corpora-
tion. 7 TCI was the largest cable system operator in the U.S. Liberty
had been formed when TCI split off certain programming interests
from its cable operations. 8 The DOJ alleged that the merger of the
separate companies would allow the merged firm to disfavor unaffili-
ated video programming providers with respect to access to the
merged firm's cable systems in favor of its affiliated programming
providers." 9 The other anticipated competitive harm was that the
merged entity could deny subscription television distributors access to
its affiliated video programming services.'
829. Id. at 33,016 (Competitive Impact Statement).
830. Id.
831. Id.
832. Id. at 33,016-17.
833. Id. at 33,017.
834. Id.
835. Id. at 33,011 (Proposed Final Judgment).
836. Id. at 33,012.
837. United States v. Tele-Communications, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 24,723 (May 12,
1994).
838. Id at 24,725 (Competitive Impact Statement).




The proposed consent decree accordingly barred the merged entity
from discriminating against unaffiliated video programming providers
and against unaffiliated multichannel subscription television providers
where such conduct would "unreasonably restrain competition."'"
While the decree did not elaborate on the quoted standard, the Com-
petitive Impact Statement noted that the decree was not intended to
inhibit good faith negotiations between the merged entity and unaffili-
ated programmers regarding terms of carriage. As to the merged eri-
tity's affiliated programming, the Competitive Impact Statement
stated that differences in prices or terms "that are reasonably based
on ordinary commercial factors" will not constitute prohibited
discrimination." 2
The enforcement efforts with respect to these transactions were not
constrained by the terms of the 1984 Guidelines. The DOJ now ap-
pears to be focused on the ability of a vertically integrated firm to
discriminate against customers or suppliers that compete with the firm
in downstream or upstream markets. The ability of the vertically inte-
grated firm to do so will depend on the firm's market power in its
capacity as a supplier to or buyer from its competitors. The other em-
phasis in these cases is the integrated firm's ability to channel to its
own business the competitively sensitive information of market play-
ers that compete with that business. Antitrust practitioners who are
sensitive to such concerns can anticipate the scrutiny of the enforce-
ment agencies and, when such scrutiny cannot be avoided, work to-
ward consent decrees that satisfy enforcement concerns while
allowing the scrutinized firms to achieve their strategic business goals.
C. Mergers and Innovation Markets
Competition in innovation is one recent merger issue that affects
many of the industries related to the information superhighway. The
DOJ and the FTC have recently taken the position that firms with
certain research and development ("R&D") capabilities may be
viewed as competitors in innovation markets that are separate from
goods or technology markets.843 Under the 1995 Department of Jus-
tice-Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing
841. Id. at 24,724 (Proposed Final Judgment).
842. Id. at 24,727.
843. 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 643, § 3.2.3. The Guidelines
note at the outset that "[t]he intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share
the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare." Id.
§ 1.0. Commentators have noted that the prominent inclusion of innovation concerns
in the Guidelines indicates a distinct change from past enforcement policy that may
be the most significant and lasting contribution of the Guidelines. See Robert E.
Bloch et al., Innovation Policy and Antitrust Enforcement: The 1995 Antitrust Guide.
lines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Antitrust Rep., June 1995, at 10, 12;
Peter Sullivan, FTC Joins DOJ in Issuing Intellectual Property Guidelines, Antitrust
Rep., June 1995, at 7, 9.
[Vol. 64
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
of Intellectual Property ("1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines"),
"An innovation market consists of the [R&D] directed to particular
new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that
[R&D]." 8 " If the capacity for R&D that will produce technology in-
novations can be associated with identifiable assets or attributes of
specific firms, then such firms' conduct may affect competition in
R&D among those firms."
The DOJ first expressed such concerns in two cases that challenged
acquisitions. In United States v. General Motors Corp.,&6 the DOJ
challenged the proposed acquisition of General Motors' Allison
Transmission Division by ZF Friedrichshafen, a German transmission
manufacturer. The DOJ alleged that GM and Friedrichshafen were
the two largest manufacturers-accounting for over eighty percent of
production-of medium and heavy automatic transmissions in the
world, and together controlled most of the R&D resources used to
develop improvements in heavy-duty automatic transmission
technology.1 7
Although the two firms competed directly in the relatively narrow
segment of applications for heavy-duty transmissions (transit buses
and refuse trucks), they competed for technological developments in
automatic transmissions used in a broader range of applications be-
yond those vehicle types.m The complaint alleged a violation of sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act in the two narrow vehicle markets. It also
alleged a violation in a separate innovation market described as the
technological innovation for the design, development, and production
of medium and heavy automatic transmissions for commercial and
military vehicles. The DOJ alleged that in this innovation market the
acquisition would reduce the number of competitors from three to
two.849 The parties abandoned the transaction. °0
In United States v. Flow International Corp.,s85 Flow International
sought to acquire its primary competitor, Ingersoll-Rand's Waterjet
Cutting Systems Division. The competitors were the two major manu-
facturers of ultra-high pressure waterjet intensifier pumps and com-
peted in the design, development, and improvement of pumps and
related equipment. The acquisition allegedly violated section 7 in the
domestic market for waterjet pumps. The complaint also alleged that
844. 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 643, § 3.2.3. The close sub-
stitutes are R&D efforts, technologies, and goods that significantly limit the market
power attending the relevant R&D. kl
845. Id.
846. 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,093, at 44,660 (Nov. 16, 1993).
847. Id. at 44,661.
848. Id.
849. Id
850. See Focus on Protecting Innovation Competition GM Walks as Justice Moves to
Block Heavy Duty Automatic Transmissions Sale, FrC_ Watch, Nov. 22, 1993.
851. 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,094, at 44,681 (Apr. 4, 1994).
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the acquisition would eliminate competition in technological innova-
tion between the two firms and that the loss of such competition
would adversely affect consumers in the downstream waterjet pump
market.852 The parties eventually abandoned the merger.8 5 3
Under the 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, the agencies may
seek to use the innovation market concept in two ways. The innova-
tion market may be used to analyze the competitive effects of the ar-
rangement in that market, as was done in General Motors.8 54
Secondly, it may be used as it was in Flow International, to aid the
analysis of competitive effects in downstream technology or goods
markets.855 The agencies may use the concept if the firms that have
the ability to participate in innovation activities can be identified and
are few in number.85 6 If the number of such firms is large, then the
agencies will assume that the innovation market is competitive and
that adverse effects on competition are unlikely.8 57 The competitive
significance of innovation market participants will be assessed based
on market share data.858 Shares of innovation markets may be calcu-
lated on the basis of shares of assets or characteristics on which inno-
vation depends, shares of R&D expenditures, shares of a related
product, or firms' capabilities and incentives to innovate. 859
Both General Motors and Flow International settled before the
courts could review the innovation market concept. As the 1995 Intel-
lectual Property Guidelines suggest, those cases signified only the be-
ginning of the enforcement agencies' use of the innovation market
concept in their enforcement efforts.86° There is debate among anti-
852. Id. at 44,682.
853. Id.
854. General Motors, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. at 44,661; 1995 Intellectual Property
Guidelines, supra note 643, § 3.2.3.
855. International Flow, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. at 44,682; 1995 Intellectual Property
Guidelines, supra note 643, § 3.2.3.
856. 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 643, § 3.2.3, example 3.
857. I&
858. Id. § 3.2.3. This assumes that market share data are available or accurately
reflect competitive significance. The agencies will also look to evidence of buyers'
and market participants' assessments of the competitive significance of innovation
market participants. Id.
859. Id.
860. See, e.g., United States v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 6 Trade Reg. Rep.(CCH) 45,095, at 44,755 (July 28, 1995) (discussing DOJ allegation that acquisition
would decrease competition in mainframe computer software and development tech-
nology; proposed settlement required acquirer to grant licenses for acquired com-
pany's products with DOJ approval and permitted court to order disposition of
additional assets); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
45,095, at 44,743 (Apr. 27, 1995) (discussing DOJ allegation that acquisition of com-
pany with leading personal finance software by company with number two software
would allow acquirer to raise prices, cause purchasers to lose innovation benefits, and
seize control of home banking and other future markets; parties abandoned merger);
Glaxo plc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,784, at 23,535 (June 14, 1995) (alleging that
acquisition reduced competition in innovation market for migraine medicines; final
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trust commentators about the appropriateness of viewing competition
for innovation as a separate market. Proponents of the approach have
argued that it will help detect evils that otherwise would remain unde-
tected. This would occur, for example, in markets where the merging
firms do not compete before the merger. Whereas current merger
analysis has a relatively short-term focus of one to two years in exam-
ining the markets in which the merging firms compete, in high tech-
nology industries, current R&D will bring about changes in the
composition and scope of future downstream product markets, and
the use of the innovation market concept extends the benefits of anti-
trust analysis beyond such a short-term view.861
order required divestiture of acquired company's worldwide R&D assets and assist-
ance so that buyer of assets could continue acquired company's research); Silicon
,Graphics, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,838, at 23,585 (FTC June 9, 1995) (pro-
posed consent order and complaint) (alleging that acquisition threatened innovation
market for high resolution computer graphics software and hardware; consent order
required acquirer to ensure other companies could compete with it by entering "port-
ing" agreement, maintaining open architecture and publishing technical data for other
software developers, and offering independent companies software development
terms offered to other companies); Montedison S.p.A., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
23,749, at 23,499 (FTC May 25, 1995) (challenging merger leading to control of two
principal competitors in polypropylene technology and technology licensing as threat
to competition in technology innovation; order required U.S. subsidiary of merging
firm to divest polypropylene assets); Boston Scientific Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 23,774, at 23,528 (FTC Apr. 28,1995) (challenging acquisition of present and
future providers of intravascular ultrasound catheter by a competitor, alleging threat
to competition in catheters and innovation market in related technology;, consent or-
der required acquirer to grant non-exclusive license of technology package to an en-
tity approved by FTC); Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,742,
at 23,494 (FTC Apr. 18, 1995) (challenging acquisition that would decrease competi-
tion in innovation market for electronic article surveillance labels; final order prohib-
ited acquirer from acquiring exclusive rights for anti-shoplifting labels from acquired
company in U.S. and Canada); Wright Medical Technology, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 1 23,726, at 23,481 (FTC Mar. 23, 1995) (alleging that acquisition would elimi-
nate innovation competition for orthopedic implants; final order required acquirer to
transfer a copy of acquired company's R&D assets to licensor of acquired company's
implant technology); American Home Prods. Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
23,712, at 23,472 (FTC Feb. 14, 1995) (alleging that merger would lessen competition
in innovation market for rotavirus vaccine; final order required acquirer to license
acquired company's rotavirus research); Oerlikon-Buhrle Holding AG., 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCII) 23,697, at 23,463 (FTC Feb. 1, 1995) (challenging acquisition that
threatened innovation in turbomolecular pump and compact disc metallizer markets,
where reputation barriers would prevent entry by new competitors soon enough to
deter reduced innovation; final order required divestiture of acquired entity's metal-
lizer and pump businesses and assistance to the purchasers); Adobe Sys. Inc., 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCII) 23,643, at 23,371 (FTC Oct. 18, 1994) (alleging that merger would
reduce innovation in market for illustration software; parties agreed to divest one
merging firm's software business and name, customer names and addresses, and mar-
keting, training, and technical support information).
861. See Michael L. Denger et al., Innovation and Tecmology-Related Markets, An-
titrust Rep., Jan. 1995, at 3, 3-7; Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporat-
ing Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets,
63 Antitrust L.J 569, 569 (1995).
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At the same time, however, there are practical difficulties in defin-
ing innovation markets. R&D efforts are generally secret efforts.
There may not be any practical way of identifying potential entrants
into the market, even if we identify the firms currently pursuing the
relevant type of innovation. Difficulties in collecting information
would hinder any reliable calculation of market shares for participants
in the market.86 Commentators have also noted that the focus on
innovation and its possible effect on competition on future product
markets implies that we value the "innovative diversity" that results
from maintaining separate R&D efforts more than we value the effi-
ciencies and synergies that might be gained from combining such ef-
forts.8 63 While this may be the view of the enforcement agencies
based on enforcement efforts like General Motors and Flow Interna-
tional, this view may assume too easily that we can predict the com-
petitive effects of combined R&D efforts. Such assumptions may not
be borne out in the realities of the marketplace. 864
V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LICENSING
The 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines 65 set forth a modified
enforcement policy that applies to licensing8 66 of know-how and prop-
erty protected by patent, copyright, and trade secret law.867 The
Guidelines illustrate the policy with hypothetical examples and useful
discussions of the agencies' approach to them.868
The Guidelines embody three general principles. First, for antitrust
purposes intellectual property should be analyzed comparably to
other forms of property. 69 Second, the agencies will not presume that
a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market
power-the ability to raise prices above a competitive level for a sig-
nificant period of time87 0 -on its owner.871 Third, licensing of intel-
lectual property is gelierally procompetitive.872 It is procompetitive
862. Denger, supra note 861, at 6.
863. Id.
864. Id.
865. 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 643.
866. The Guidelines do not set forth new rules for licensing arrangements constitut-
ing acquisitions of intellectual property, i.e., outright sales of all rights to the property
or exclusive licenses that preclude the licensor and all other persons from using the
property. Id. § 5.7. In such transactions the agencies will apply the merger analysis set
forth in the agencies' 1992 Guidelines on horizontal mergers. Id.
867. In excluding application to trademarks, the 1995 Intellectual Property Guide-
lines distinguish trademarks as involving product differentiation issues rather than the
technology transfer and innovation-related issues of the other regimes, but neverthe-
less state that the same general antitrust principles apply to trademarks. Id. § 1.0 n.1.
868. Id. §§ 2.3, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1.2, 5.1, 5.5, 5.7.
869. Id. §§ 2.0, 2.1.
870. Id. § 2.2; see also George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 Antitrust L.J.
807, 812-13 (1992) (defining market power).
871. 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 643, § 2.2.
872. Id. §§ 2.0, 2.3.
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because it promotes efficiencies in firms' combination of inputs in the
development of new products." 3 Licensing also affords licensors in-
centives to invest in intellectual property creation and R&D, while it
affords licensees incentives to invest in commercialization and distri-
bution of products containing the property.8s 4
The antitrust concern of the agencies will be whether the license
impedes competition among entities that would have been actual or
likely potential competitors in the absence of the license, or harms
competition in another market by foreclosing access to, or raising the
price of, an important input.8s 5 Such competition may be impeded
notwithstanding the fact that the law gives intellectual property own-
ers the right not to transfer the property on any terms whatsoeverYsv6
The focus of the agencies will be on the arrangement's effect, not its
form.8r7
The 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines recognize that a licensing
arrangement may affect competition in a variety of markets. The rele-
vant markets to be evaluated potentially include the products made
with the use of the technology at issue (or input goods used with the
technology to make those products),78 the "technology market" (the
intellectual property and technologies or goods that are close substi-
tutes for it),879 and the "innovation market" (R&D and its substi-
tutes),s8° Such markets will be defined and market shares will be
calculated in the manner specified in the 1992 Guidelines on horizon-
tal mergers. 81
The antitrust analysis of licensing arrangements will examine
whether the parties to the arrangement exist in a primarily horizontal
or vertical relationship.' Consistent with the closer level of scrutiny
of horizontal restrictions in other antitrust contexts, the agencies will
likely examine closely any arrangements between firms that manufac-
ture or sell substitute goods, that have rights in substitute technolo-
gies, or that otherwise would have competed absent the licenseYs
The typical licensing arrangement, however, has a vertical compo-
nent.s8s Primarily vertical arrangements, where the parties occupy a
seller-buyer relationship or engage in other complementary activities,
will receive less scrutiny, but are not immune from challenge.'
873. Id. § 2.3.
874. Id.
875. Id. § 3.1.
876. Id. §§ 2.2, 3.1.
877. Id. § 3.1.
878. Id. § 32.1.
879. Id. § 3.22.
880. Id. § 3.2.3.
881. Id. §§ 32.1, 32.2 n.20; see supra part IV.A.






In most cases, intellectual property licensing arrangements will be
reviewed under the rule of reason. 886 The 1995 Guidelines recognize,
however, that certain plainly anticompetitive restraints should be
treated as unlawful per se. 7 Examples of restraints warranting per se
treatment are price fixing, output restraints, market division by hori-
zontal competitors, resale price maintenance, and certain group
boycotts.888
Before determining whether the rule of reason or per se treatment
will apply, the agencies will determine whether the restraint "can be
expected to contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of eco-
nomic activity." 889 This can occur, for example, whenever the licens-
ing arrangement reduces transaction costs or aligns the incentives of
the licensor and licensee to promote the licensed technology.890 In
general, licensing arrangements promote such integrations.89' If no
efficiency-enhancing integration is found and the restraint is a type
that has been accorded per se treatment, the agencies will challenge it
under the per se rule.8 1 Otherwise, the rule of reason will be
applied.893
The rule of reason inquiry may be "truncated" in certain circum-
stances.894 If a restraint has no anticompetitive effects, the agencies
will treat it as reasonable, without analyzing market power or the re-
straint's justifications.895 If the restraint appears on its face to reduce
output or increase prices, it will be challenged without any elaborate
analysis of market conditions. s96
In a complete rule of reason analysis, the agencies will inquire
whether the licensing arrangement is likely to have an anticompetitive
effect.8 97 The risk of retarding development of new or improved
goods or processes, market structure (market concentration, ease of
entry into the market, responsiveness of supply and demand to
changes in price), the potential for facilitating pricing or output coor-
dination, and the foreclosure of other parties from the market are all
factors examined in the inquiry.8 98







893. Id. Commentators have suggested that the 1995 Guidelines, by providing that
practices long considered illegal per se may be permissible if they perform an eff-
ciency-enhancing function, are more permissive than the courts have been with re-
spect to such practices. See Bloch, supra note 843, at 15-16.
894. 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 643, § 3.4.
895. IM.
896. Id.
897. Id. §§ 4.1-4.1.2.
898. Id. § 4.1.1.
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If a licensing arrangement is unlikely to have an anticompetitive
effect, it will not be challenged.' If an anticompetitive effect is
likely, however, before condemning it the agencies will consider
whether the restraint is reasonably necessary in order to achieve
procompetitive efficiencies."0 Reasonable necessity may turn on the
existence of practical and significantly less restrictive alternatives and
the duration of the restraint. 1 If the restraint is reasonably neces-
sary, the agencies will then weigh the procompetitive efficiencies and
the anticompetitive effects to determine "the probable net effect on
competition in each relevant market."9 2
For the first time, the 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines articu-
late a "safety zone" to provide parties some certainty and encourage
beneficial licensing arrangements. 3 The agencies will not attack a
restraint in a licensing arrangement, "[a]bsent extraordinary circum-
stances," if "(1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive" (normally
warranting per se treatment or otherwise tending almost always to re-
duce output or increase prices), 9" and "(2) the licensor and its licen-
sees collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each
relevant market affected by the restraint.' "110 This safety zone immu-
nity does not apply, however, to transactions that amount to mergers
or acquisitions, which continue to be governed by the 1992 Guidelines
on horizontal mergers. 906
If the license requires analysis of the technology or innovation mar-
kets, and market share data are not available or do not represent com-
petitive significance, the second safety zone criterion differs.907 For
technology markets, the second criterion is the presence of four or
more independently controlled technologies, in addition to that of the
licensor and licensees, that may be substitutable for the licensed tech-
nology at a comparable cost to the user.Y For innovation markets,
the second criterion is the presence of four or more independently
controlled entities, in addition to the licensor and licensees, that "pos-
sess the required specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive
to engage in [R&D] that is a close substitute for the [R&D] activities
of the parties" to the license. 9
899. Id. § 4.2.
900. Id
901. Id.
902. Id. The Guidelines note that this balancing is qualitative. As expected an-
ticompetitive effects in a licensing arrangement increase, the agencies will require
proof of a greater level of expected efficiencies. hla
903. Id. § 4.3.
904. Id. § 4.3 & n.30.
905. Id § 4.3.
906. Id. 8H 4.3, 5.7 & n.37.





The 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines also apply their princi-
ples to particular types of licensing arrangements. These include hori-
zontal restraints (per se or rule of reason treatment), 910 resale price
maintenance (per se), 911 tying arrangements (per se or rule of rea-
son).912 exclusive dealing (rule of reason), 913 cross-licensing and pool-
ing arrangements (per se or rule of reason),914 and grantbacks (rule of
reason).915 The discussions provide a useful starting point for practi-
tioners devising an antitrust counseling strategy involving similar
transactions.
Recent enforcement efforts illustrate that the DOJ's more aggres-
sive approach is consistent with the sharpened focus of the 1995 Intel-
lectual Property Guidelines. In United States v. S.C. Johnson &
Son,9 16 the DOJ challenged a nonexclusive vertical license granted by
Bayer, a foreign insecticide supplier to the leading domestic insecti-
cide seller. The license apparently did not preclude the licensor from
entering the domestic market. The DOJ alleged, however, that the
license reduced the licensor's incentives to enter the domestic market
and become a horizontal competitor of the licensee. The DOJ rea-
soned that the licensor effectively chose not to compete in the domes-
tic market because it had considered entering the market, chose not
to, and licensed its technology instead.917 In addition, although the
license was nonexclusive, the DOJ found it significant that the licensor
chose not to license any other entity, and thus viewed the license as if
it were exclusive. 91 8 The DOJ also relied on the fact that the licensor
had licensed a company with a large share of the domestic market
rather than one with a smaller share, suggesting that such a licensor
needs to license smaller firms when it licenses the largest firm in a
concentrated market.919
The case appears to follow basic statements in the 1995 Intellectual
Property Guidelines that antitrust concerns may arise when a licensing
arrangement harms competition among entities that would have been
actual or likely potential competitors in the absence of the license, 920
that licensors and licensees in a complementary or vertical relation-
ship may also occupy a horizontal relationship, 92' and that the en-
forcement agencies will focus on the actual effects of a license rather
910. Id. § 5.1.
911. Id. § 5.2.
912. 1l § 5.3.
913. Id. § 5.4.
914. Id. § 5.5.
915. Id. § 5.6.
916. 59 Fed. Reg. 43,859 (Aug. 25, 1994) (Proposed Final Judgment and Competi-
tive Impact Statement).
917. Id. at 43,860.
918. Id. at 43,863.
919. Id.
920. 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 643, § 3.1.
921. Id. § 3.3.
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than on its formal terms.' The 1995 Guidelines note that "[a] firm
will be treated as a likely potential competitor if there is evidence that
entry by that firm is reasonably probable in the absence of the licens-
ing arrangement."'  The evidence that Bayer would enter the do-
mestic insecticide market with reasonable probability was apparently
the fact that it had considered entering the market, but instead de-
cided to license its insecticide ingredient.
The license, however, did not restrict Bayer's ability to enter the
market either at the time of the license or at any time in the future.
There was also no restriction on Bayer's ability to license its ingredi-
ent to a licensee other than S.C. Johnson in the future. It is difficult to
reconcile the enforcement analysis of this license with the Guidelines'
statement that "[a] non-exclusive license... that does not contain any
restraints on the competitive conduct of the licensor or the licensee
generally does not present antitrust concerns even if the parties ...
are in a horizontal relationship," 9 4 and the general policy of promot-
ing innovation and other procompetitive benefits of licensing.'
From a practical point of view, moreover, it is unclear how a firm
can go through its business analysis of the options (to license intellec-
tual property or enter a market related to that property, or both) with-
out drawing antitrust scrutiny. In S.C. Johnson, the license
arrangement and its commercial context were not at all unusual.
Thus, the implications of the case-that licensors should consider
market entry and other options before granting a license, that they
must avoid entering arrangements with only a large market player,
and that they must license more than one licensee-could very well
chill efforts to license technology.f'
In United States v. Microsoft Corp., "7 the DOJ challenged license
practices imposed vertically by Microsoft. Microsoft allegedly had
monopoly power in computer operating system technology, and the
imposed sales practices allegedly made it more difficult for competing
operating systems developers to find a market for their products.9 "8
Among the practices challenged were pricing provisions requiring
computer manufacturers to pay a license fee on a per-processor basis,
whether or not Microsoft's MS-DOS was installed on a sold proces-
922. Id. § 3.1.
923. Id. § 3.1 n.14.
924. Id. § 4.1.2.
925. Id. § 2.3.
926. For a discussion along the same lines, see Robert P. Taylor, Pilldngton,
Microsoft and S.C. Johnson Signal a Policy Shift at DOJ, Antitrust, Fall 1994, at 23-27.
927. 59 Fed. Reg. 42,845 (Aug. 19, 1994) (Proposed Final Judgment and Competi-
tive Impact Statement).
928. Id. at 42,846.
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sor.929 In addition, long term contracts locked in computer
manufacturers.930
Although both S.C. Johnson and Microsoft involved challenges to
vertical licensing arrangements, the challenge in Microsoft is much
less surprising. The contracts that required computer manufacturers
to pay a license fee to Microsoft, regardless of the installation of MS-
DOS on any given computer sold by the manufacturers, restrained the
manufacturers from using operating systems of Microsoft's competi-
tors. Even though the contracts did not explicitly require exclusive
dealing between Microsoft and its licensees, they had the effect of ex-
clusivity because they significantly increased the licensees' costs when
they used competing technologies.93' The licensees were faced with a
disincentive to sell computers with other operating systems because
they would have been forced to pay license fees to two operating sys-
tem providers. As a result, the arrangement likely reduced competi-
tion in the operating system market by foreclosing the exploitation
and development of non-Microsoft operating systems.932
CONCLUSION
This section of the Report has attempted to set out a basic perspec-
tive of antitrust considerations relevant to the information superhigh-
way. It is anything but exhaustive, but it is a starting point for
practitioners who may be confronted with competition issues down
the road.
However we define the information superhighway, it is anything but
static. Consumers will act on their preferences and change them.
Market players will succeed and fail. Driven by technology and inno-
vation, tangible and intangible products and services and their distri-
bution channels will continue to evolve. Market players will rely
increasingly on mergers, licensing arrangements, joint ventures, mar-
keting alliances, and other strategies to share risks and resources as
they seek their market footholds. It will remain challenging for the
courts, the enforcement agencies, and the parties before them to keep
pace with such developments, as they assess antitrust concerns against
the realities of the changing competitive environment.
929. Id. at 42,850.
930. Id.
931. See 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 643, § 4.1.2.
932. See id. §§ 4.1.1, 5.4. Under the Guidelines, the long term contracts that locked
in computer manufacturers were likely to result in an anticompetitive effect. See id.
§ 5.4.
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